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Abstract
This paper explores the issue of whether strict liability imposed on polluters has
served to reduce uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment.  Strict liability should
create additional incentives for firms to handle hazardous substances more carefully, thus
reducing the future likelihood of uncontrolled releases of toxics. However, the size of these
incentives may vary according to the size of a firm's assets, since asset size is the ultimate
limit on a firm's liability.  We are therefore interested to see whether imposing strict liability
for the cost of remediation at hazardous waste sites has encouraged firms  to handle toxic
materials more carefully and has uniformly reduced the incidence of toxic spills, or whether
the effect is dependent on firm size and other factors.
To answer these questions, we exploit the variation in state hazardous waste site laws
across states and over time.  We use data on accidents and spills involving hazardous
substances coming from a comprehensive database of events reported to the US EPA under
their Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS), and fit regressions relating the
frequency of spills of selected chemicals used in manufacturing to the type of liability in force
in a state.  We control for the extent of manufacturing activity in the state, and include in the
regression other program features that might alter firms' expected outlays in the event of an
accident, and thus affect firms' incentives to take care.
Results vary with the chemical being analyzed.  For some chemicals, such as
halogenated solvents, the presence of strict liability does not provide any additional
explanatory power for the number of spills beyond what is achieved by the number of
establishments and the sectoral composition of manufacturing.  For other families of
chemicals (acids, ammonia and chlorine), we find that the impacts of manufacturing activities
on the number of spills in each state do vary systematically with the liability regime.  In
particular, it appears that under strict liability small firms are responsible for a
disproportionate number of spills.  Since strict liability states tend to have more
manufacturing firms, and more small manufacturing firms, these factors serve to increase the
number of spills of these chemicals in strict liability states.
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STRICT LIABILITY AS A DETERRENT IN TOXIC WASTE MANAGEMENT:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM ACCIDENT AND SPILL DATA
Anna Alberini and David H. Austin1
1.   INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of whether strict liability imposed on
polluters has served to reduce uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment.  Because it
imposes pollution damages upon the polluter, strict liability should create additional incentives
for firms to handle hazardous substances more carefully, thus reducing the future likelihood of
such uncontrolled releases.
Provisions making polluters liable for the damages caused by their polluting activities
have, in fact, been incorporated into a number of federal and state environmental laws passed
over the last two decades.  For instance, the federal program commonly known as Superfund
(CERCLA, 1980; re-authorized in 1986 and further extended in 19912) and the hazardous
waste cleanup laws of many states hold those parties that have contributed to forming high-
risk hazardous waste sites liable for the costs of cleanup.  Similarly, the Offshore Continental
Shelf Act (1974) imposes strict liability on oil companies for damages from off-shore spills
occurring during drilling operations, and requires use of the best available technologies to
ensure safe drilling.
It has been argued that liability law is an important and promising policy tool for
dealing with pollution problems (Tietenberg, 1989).  Economic theory, however, is
ambivalent about its effects.  Firms with relatively limited assets may be sheltered from the
economic incentives created by strict liability (Shavell, 1984; Tietenberg, 1989).  Shavell
(1984) specifically considers small firms in comparing probabilities of accidental releases
under strict liability and under an alternative regime based on a negligence standard,
discussing the conditions under which one of these liability regimes may be preferred to the
other.  Beard (1990) and Larson (1996) find that the effect of imposing strict liability remains,
at best, uncertain.  They dispel the notion that under strict liability the level of care taken by a
firm to prevent accidental releases is always increasing in firm wealth, and conclude that
large, wealthy firms may or may not be safer than smaller ones.
                                               
1 Alberini, Economics Department, University of Colorado, Boulder; Austin, Quality of the Environment
Division, Resources for the Future.
2 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, commonly known as
Superfund, instructs the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to identify and list hazardous waste sites that
pose a threat to human health and the environment, track down potentially responsible parties and force them to
clean up (or to reimburse EPA for a cleanup already initiated by the agency).  The EPA has generally interpreted
the law to apply to closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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Firms may even select their asset level or corporate financial structure to minimize
payment of damages in the event of an accident (Pitchford, 1995).  Ringleb and Wiggins
(1990) provide evidence that imposition of strict liability may have in fact encouraged
wealthier firms to spin off into, or subcontract risky operations to, smaller, judgment-proof
companies in hopes of avoiding liability.3
In light of the many possible effects of imposing liability on polluters, it is rather
surprising that so little empirical work has been done to date to examine firms' actual responses
to environmental liability law.  Opaluch and Grigalunas (1984) present evidence that bids for
tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf do reflect the environmental risks perceived by firms under
the Offshore Continental Shelf Act, but we are not aware of any empirical studies examining the
role of liability as a deterrent to uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment.
In this paper, we set out to explore this issue, focusing specifically on firm liability for
the cost of remediation at hazardous waste sites.  Under the Federal Superfund law, certain
parties ñ including waste generators and transporters, and operators of waste sites ñ are held
responsible for any cleanup costs at high-risk toxic waste sites, without requiring proof they
acted negligently or with intent (Fogleman, 1992).4  In addition, many states have established
their own cleanup programs, with authorities and capabilities similar to those of the federal
Superfund program.  These state cleanup programs were authorized within a few years after
the passage of the federal Superfund, in order to address the numerous sites which are not
included on the National Priority List (NPL), and so do not qualify for federally financed
remediation (Barnett, 1994).5  Their specific provisions, including the imposition of strict
liability, vary across states, and many have evolved considerably since the program's
inception.  These differences, across states and over time, provide us with a natural
experiment for assessing strict liability's effects on the handling of toxics.
We use data on accidents and spills involving hazardous substances to establish
whether their frequency of occurrence has been systematically affected by the introduction of
strict liability.  The data come from a comprehensive database of events reported to the US
EPA under their Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS).  Because ERNS begins
in 1987, we are unable to establish whether the passage of the federal Superfund law has
affected the occurrence of accidental releases.  Instead, we examine whether the strict liability
feature of state cleanup programs has had any additional influence on the number of
                                               
3 Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) deal with occupational safety.  They find that entry of small manufacturing
companies has been particularly pronounced into industrial sectors with high potential liability for workers' long-
term health effects from toxic exposures.  This suggests that regulations, dating from the 1970s, that make firms
liable for such adverse health effects have resulted in large companies delegating operations bearing toxics risks
to smaller, judgment-proof companies.
4 The courts have interpreted Superfund as imposing joint and several liability, which holds all potentially
responsible parties liable for the entire amount of the cleanup when it is not possible to determine their
individual contributions.
5 The state mini-superfund programs also contain provisions for the funding of the state's share of the cost of
cleanup at NPL sites.  Such share is mandated by CERCLA.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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accidental events, above and beyond that of the federal Superfund.  In particular, we care to
see whether the effect of strict liability on firms' handling of toxic materials has been
uniformly to reduce the incidence of toxic spills, or whether its effect is dependent on firm
size and other factors.
To study this relationship, we estimate regressions relating the frequency of spills of
selected chemicals used in manufacturing to the type of liability in force in a state.  We
control for the extent of manufacturing activity in the state, and include in the regression other
program features that might alter firms' expected outlays in the event of an accident, and thus
affect firms' incentives to take care.
Results vary with the chemical being analyzed.  For some chemicals, such as
halogenated solvents, the presence of strict liability does not provide any additional
explanatory power for the number of spills beyond what is achieved by the number of
establishments and the sectoral composition of manufacturing.  For other families of
chemicals (acids, ammonia and chlorine), we find that the impacts of manufacturing activities
on the number of spills in each state do vary systematically with the liability regime.  In
particular, it appears that under strict liability small firms are responsible for a larger share of
spills.  Since strict liability states tend to have more manufacturing firms and more small
manufacturing firms, these factors serve to increase the number of spills of these chemicals in
strict liability states.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theoretical considerations;
Section 3 describes our data on accidental releases of toxics; Section 4 discusses the state
mini-superfund programs; the econometric model, the variables and the regression strategy
are presented in Section 5; and Sections 6 and 7 present the results and conclusions.
2.   THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we examine the models of Shavell (1984), Beard (1990) and Larson
(1996) to establish the determinants of firms' optimal levels of care against uncontrolled
releases of pollutants into the environment, and to provide a framework for our empirical work.
Shavell (1984) considers a firm that, at some cost x, can reduce its likelihood of an
accident.  When an accident occurs, damages are $D, which is fixed for a given firm, but
varies across firms.  The regulator knows only the distribution of D over the firms, but not the
firm-specific level of D.  Shavell shows that -- if the harm caused by some parties can exceed
their assets, or if some parties can escape legal judgement -- the level of care taken by a firm
under strict liability is less than the socially optimal level.  Under strict liability, a firm's level
of care increases with the size of the potential damages D it faces, but only so long as D is less
than the wealth of the firm.  Liability can be superior to a negligence standard when either the
likelihood of a suit is high, firms' assets are large relative to damages, or there is heterogeneity
across firms in the size of potential damages they face.
To summarize, imposing strict liability has the potential to change the level of care
taken by a firm relative to a negligence standard -- and hence the probability of an accident.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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The size of the change should depend on firms' total potential liability, D;6 on the wealth of
the firm, W; on the probability of a suit, p; and on regulator's ability, absent strict liability
provisions, to appropriately set the negligence standard, which in turn depends on the
variation of D across firms.  Formally, the difference in accident probabilities between the
two liability regimes is given by:
(PN -PS) = f(D, W, s(D), p; I)  (1)
where PI  denotes the probability of an accidental release of toxics under regime I, I ˛
{N(egligence), S(trict)}, and s(D) measures the variation in D across firms.  Equation (1)
informs our empirical analyses by suggesting that in addition to I, we must control for W, D,
s(D), and p.  Shavell argues that (PN -PS) is an increasing function of (W-D), s(D), and p.  This
suggests, in particular, that for given levels of s(D) and p, small (large) firms -- for which W-
D is more likely negative (positive) -- may take a greater level of care under a negligence
standard (strict liability).
Other models, such as those developed by Beard (1990) and Larson (1996), do not
necessarily support this hypothesis.  Beard (1990) allows the size of the damages from an
accident to be random.  While the probability of an accident is influenced by a firm's level of
care, in this model the distribution of the size of the damages is not.  As in Shavell's model, if
the damages exceed the assets of the firms, disbursements are virtually "truncated" by
bankruptcy.  This makes the private benefits of care lower than the social benefits, and the
private costs of care lower than the social costs.  In Beard's model, firms subject to strict
liability may either over- or under-invest in care relative to the socially optimally level,
depending on the distribution of accident size, and wealthy firms may not necessarily invest in
more care than smaller firms.
Larson (1996) considers firms facing uncertainty about their profits in addition to
uncertainty about accidental releases.  Firms choose between allocating resources to
production involving toxics and to riskless investments.  Firms' level of care is shown to be
increasing in wealth only for firms operating in "extremely hazardous" sectors (where an
accident would always put the firm out of business).
Together, the Beard and Larson models suggest that whether the liability regime and
other factors increase or decrease the likelihood of accidents remains an empirical issue, and
that no prior expectations can be formed on the direction of the effects of W, I, s(D), and D on
the likelihood of accidental events. It is, indeed, this empirical issue that we explore in this
paper.  To examine how toxic spill rates respond to the incentives created by strict liability,
we focus on sudden and accidental releases occurring over a relatively recent time period.
                                               
6 D includes, in the case of remediation at hazardous waste sites, cleanup costs, compensation to victims, and
punitive damages (if prescribed by law).Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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3.   THE SPILL AND ACCIDENT DATA
Datasets documenting individual spill events are publicly available, but in most cases
do not contain information sufficient to identify the parties responsible for the spill.  Hence,
we aggregate the spill counts by state and year, and use state-level variables in proxying for
D, s(D), W, and p as predictors of the number of spills.7  Spill and accident figures come from
EPA's Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS) database.8
For each spill or release, the ERNS database reports the date and place where each
discharge occurred, identifies the nature of the substance spilled, the statute under which the
release was reported, the medium into which the substance was released (air, soil, water,
groundwater), and specifies whether the accident occurred during transportation or within a
facility.  It also attempts to identify the cause of the accident (natural phenomenon, operator
error, equipment failure, etc.) and to provide a rough description of the circumstances
surrounding the accident.  Unfortunately, cause and description information are incomplete or
missing for most spills.
Figures for the number of people injured, the number of fatalities, the number of
people evacuated from a facility, and the estimated damage to property (in dollars) are also
provided.  Finally, the ERNS data indicate whether the party responsible is a private citizen, a
firm, or a government agency.  In most cases, however, firm names, addresses and Dun &
Bradstreet identification numbers are not available.
We were initially interested in estimating models of the quantity of chemicals
released.  We were concerned that strict liability would have affected the severity of spills, as
well as their number.  We found, however, that for many spills the quantity released data are
missing or set to zero for lack of better information, making total quantities systematically
                                               
7 Given our interest in policies that address toxic waste sites, another way of examining the outcome of imposing
liability could be to focus on the number of hazardous waste sites listed under the federal or state programs.  We
opted against doing so for two reasons.  First, many such sites are the result of disposal practices of the past, and do
not reflect current incentives.  Second, the discovery of such hazardous waste sites and their placement on priority
lists depends crucially on the state or federal enforcement activity, while here we wish to focus on firm behaviors.
8 Reporting requirements are spelled out in Superfund (CERCLA), the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, the Hazardous Material Transportation Act (HMTA) of 1974, and the
Clean Water Act.  Reporting criteria vary, depending on the federal statute. CERCLA, Section 103, requires that
any release of a CERCLA hazardous substance meeting or exceeding the reportable quantity prescribed in 40 CFR
302.4 be reported to the National Response Center.  Several CERCLA toxic substances are also simultaneously
defined as RCRA hazardous wastes, Clean Air Act hazardous air pollutants, and "imminently hazardous"
substances addressed by the Toxic Substances Control Act.  EPCRA requires that the release of a reportable
quantity of an EPCRA extremely hazardous substance or a CERCLA hazardous substance (one pound or more,
unless otherwise specified by regulation) resulting in exposure of people outside the boundary of the facility
where the release occurs be reported to the State and local authorities.  HMTA requires that the release of a DOT
hazardous material during transportation be reported to the National Response Center under certain circumstances,
such as death, injury, significant property damage, evacuation, highway closure, etc.  Finally, the Clean Water Act
requires that the release of oil be reported to the National Response Center if the release: (1) violates applicable
quality standards; (2) causes a film, sheen or discoloration of the water or adjoining shoreline; or (3) causes a
sludge or an emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon the adjoining shoreline.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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under-reported.  Accordingly, in this paper we analyze the determinants of the number of
spills per year in each state, from the beginning of 1987 to the end of 1995.
Since our data are aggregated to the number of spills and accidents per state per year, we
need a way of controlling for differing patterns in the way various chemicals are used in
manufacturing.  These patterns may influence the seriousness of the damages from the spills.
We control for differences in how each chemical is used by organizing our analyses along more
or less narrow chemical divisions.  This approach also has the advantage of controlling for
differences in the ways such substances may be regulated, and in ERNS reporting requirements.
Specifically, we focus on spills involving selected substances or groups of relatively
similar, highly toxic, CERCLA-regulated substances used in manufacturing: (1) acids;
(2) chlorine and chlorine dioxide; (3) anhydrous ammonia; (4) four halogenated solvents:
methylene chloride (METH), perchloroethylene (PERC), trichloroethylene (TCE), and 1,1,1-
or 1,1,2-trichloroethane (TCA); and (5) a broader group of halogenated solvents that adds
methyl-ethyl ketone, chloroform, and carbon tetrachloride to the four solvents already
mentioned.  (See the appendix for descriptions of these chemicals, their properties and uses,
and their effects on human health.)
Out of the 12,662 ERNS-reported accidents involving releases of acids between 1987
and 1995, more than 22 percent involved sulfuric acid, and over 14 percent involved
hydrochloric acid.  A significant fraction of these spills occurred in California, which between
1987 and 1995 had 2,354 spills reported to ERNS, followed by Texas (2,027), Louisiana
(720), and Pennsylvania and Illinois (453 each), as shown in Figure 1.  About 51.4 percent of
these spills are classified as primarily affecting land, another 25.5 percent affected air, 15.4
percent water; 3.4 percent of the spills were contained within a firm's facility, and 1.3 percent
affected groundwater.  Most of the spills occurred at a firm's facility (70 percent),9 with
highway and railroad spills accounting for another approximately 11.6 and 10.7 percent of the
spills, respectively.
Acid spills were by far the most common type of accident in the ERNS data among
the chemical families we examine.  By contrast, over the nine years between 1987 and 1995
there were 3,412 releases of chlorine or chlorine dioxide and 5,995 accidental releases of
anhydrous ammonia.  Over three-quarters of these releases occurred into air.  We counted
more than 2,000 accidents involving METH, PERC, TCE, and TCA (air releases slightly
outnumbering spills on land, 43 percent to 38 percent, with the remainder distributed 12
percent in water, 2.8 percent in groundwater, and 1.6 percent contained within the facility).
Even more so than with acid spills, most of these releases (over eight-five percent) occurred at
a fixed facility, as opposed to during transport.  The remainder of the releases were about
equally distributed among highway and railroad spills.
For all of the families of chemicals considered here, the geographic distribution of the
spills is qualitatively very similar to that displayed in Figure 1 for acids, suggesting that
                                               
9 Note the difference between a spill at a firm's facility (70 percent of all spills), and one that was successfully
contained within the facility (without spilling on the ground or into air or water; only 3.4 percent of all spills).7
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accidental releases tend to be most common in large states with strong manufacturing
economies, and especially in states with a significant amount of activity in the chemical
sectors.  The number of spills should, therefore, be related to the number of firms and to
production levels in the manufacturing and chemical-intensive sectors of each state.
4.   STATE MINI-SUPERFUND PROGRAMS
Since the early 1980s, many states have enacted laws and developed programs similar
to the federal Superfund program, providing for emergency response actions and long-term
remediation at hazardous waste sites.  These statutes often establish a financing mechanism to
pay for initial feasibility studies and remediation activities, spell out the conditions under
which monies from such funds are to be used, and contain provisions conferring authority to
force responsible parties to conduct feasibility studies and cleanups, and/or pay for them
(EPA, 1989, 1990, 1991; ELI, 1993, 1995).
By 1989, thirty-nine states had created such funding and enforcement authorities.
This number had climbed to 45 by 1995, as shown in Figure 2.  The five states without
separate mini-superfund programs addressed hazardous waste issues using other regulations.
One important difference between the Federal Superfund program and many state
mini-superfund programs lies in the liability standards imposed on the responsible parties:
Liability under the federal Superfund is strict, joint and several, but this is not necessarily the
case for many of the state programs.  As of 1987, only twenty-seven states had instituted strict
liability; by 1995 this number had climbed to forty.10
The state mini-superfund programs may enable states to initiate cleanup when the
responsible parties are uncooperative, and to seek to recover cleanup costs from them.  State
mini-superfund laws may also include provisions allowing private citizens, as opposed to
government agencies, to file civil actions requiring that the responsible party prevent further
damage or take corrective action if citizens have been adversely affected.  In some states (15
in 1995) responsible parties must compensate those who are affected by the release of the
toxic substances.  Compensation is usually limited to paying for alternative drinking water
supplies or for temporary relocation.
5.   REGRESSION MODELS
To check whether a state's liability structure influences the frequency of accidents, we
exploit differences in the provisions of the various state mini-superfund programs.  In this
paper, we focus on spills occurring at fixed facilities, and separately analyze each chemical
family, explaining numbers of spills.  For the two chemical families with an abundance of
spills per year ñ acids and ammonia ñ we use an OLS regression model. For the other families
with fewer spills, we use a Poisson model.
                                               
10 Strict liability is often, but not always, paired with joint-and-several liability.  In 1987, 8 states had strict, but
not joint-and-several, liability and 19 had both.  By 1995, the number of states with strict, but not joint-and-
several, liability, was 6, while states with both strict and joint-and-several liability numbered to 34.9
Figure 2.  States' Adoption of Strict Liability
Year of Adoption
adopted 1987 or earlier   (28)
adopted 1988-1991   (8)
adopted 1992-1995   (6)
not yet adopted   (9)Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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victim compensation in the state mini-superfund program, and for whether a state initiating
cleanup in the presence of recalcitrant responsible parties may impose punitive damages.
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics
Label Description mean std. dev.
AREA total area of the state (square miles) 72,824 90,072
POPUL state population (thousands) 4945.76 5460.24
ALL_MIN number of mining establishments in the state 583.55 1091.20
MFGESTAB number of manufacturing establishments in the
state
7211.52 8472.52
SMLMFG number of manufacturing establishments with fewer
than 20 employees in the state
4763.28 5747.49
LGMFG number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or
more employees in the state
2366.13 2731.75
SMLMINE number of mining establishments with fewer than 20
employees in the state
466.80 912.28
LGMINE number of mining establishments with 20 or more
employees in the state
116.77 187.98
ENVORG number of in-state members of three major
environmental organizations, per 1000 residents
8.49 3.54
HAZWASTE quantity of hazardous waste per capita generated in
the state (thousands of lbs)
1.58 2.91
ACID spills number of reported acids spills per state per year 18.54 34.67
AMMONIA spills number of reported ammonia spills 10.98 16.55
HALOGENATED
SOLVENTS spills I
number of spills of TCA, TCE, METH and PERC 2.44 3.47
HALOGENATED
SOLVENTS spills II
number of spills of broader group of halogenated
solvents
4.70 12.54
CHLORINE spills number of spills of chlorine/chlorine dioxide 6.27 9.33
STRICT state program imposes strict liability .68 .47
CITSUIT state program allows citizen suit .31 .46
PUNDAMAG punitive damages charged to uncooperative firms .56 .50
VICTCOMP firms required to compensate victims of release .24 .43Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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To account for the probability p of being targeted by the agency, we construct a
dummy (CITSUIT) for whether private citizens can initiate actions against parties responsible
for toxic releases.  We treat this provision as an effective broadening of the reach of the state
environmental agency, because it increases the ability of private citizens to serve as
"deputies" for the agency, possibly permitting closer oversight over firm behavior than the
agency could achieve by itself.
The regressor at the heart of this paper is, of course, STRICT, our indicator for
whether the mini-superfund program prescribes strict liability.  We note that in practice,
STRICT could also influence firms' perceived probabilities of being targeted by the agency.
In the absence of strict liability, the agency may have only limited control over potentially
responsible parties, possibly giving firms less incentive to take care, with the result that there
may be more ñ or more severe ñ spills.  Of course, theory suggests the effect may work in the
other direction, and it is left to empirical work to reveal its actual effect.
We lag the dummy variables STRICT, CITSUIT, VICTCOMP, PUNDAMAG one
year in hopes of avoiding possible endogeneity with the dependent variable (number of
spills), and to account for the lag, if any, in firms' behavioral responses to new laws.
To control for possible differences in state propensities to report spills to ERNS, we
include in the regression model two variables that we believe influence the reporting of spills:
population density (accidents may be more difficult to conceal in highly populated places),
and membership, per 1000 residents, in either of three major environmental organizations
(environmental awareness of the population may affect the level of scrutiny and reporting).
Population density may also influence the extent, and hence the cost, of cleanup.  Finally, we
include among the regressors the amount of hazardous waste per capita generated in the state.
For both the OLS and the Poisson regressions, our first order of business is to
determine whether strict liability and the other attributes of a state's mini-superfund program
explain the number of spills beyond what is predicted by the extent of manufacturing and the
reporting variables.  To do so, we regress the number of accidental releases in a state on
manufacturing and reporting variables, and state program dummies, simply entered additively
in the right-hand side of the model.
After establishing these relationships, we attempt to control for the composition of
manufacturing in each state over several key industrial sectors.  To see if behavioral responses
of firms are structurally different under the two alternative liability regimes, we then run
separate regressions for states and years with and without strict liability.
6.   RESULTS
Initial Regressions
As shown in Table 2, the number of spills a state experiences in a year is generally
well predicted by the numbers of manufacturing and mining establishments located there, the
amount of hazardous waste generated in the state, the degree of environmental awareness of
the public, population density, and the policy dummies.  Jointly considered, these regressors13
Table 2.  Spills in fixed facilities:  Basic specifications
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2 0.6423 0.6649 0.4675 0.4684
F statistic 78.997 70.252 43.904 39.281
Log Likelihood -3303.03 -3366.59 -3161.45 -2216.34 -250.13 -251.23
n 392 384 392 392 391 391 391 392 392 392
T statistics in parentheses. Poisson regression: misspecification-consistent t statistics.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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are significant predictors of the numbers of spills at conventional significance levels and
explain a reasonable portion of the variability in the dependent variable.  The adjusted R
squares in the models for acid and ammonia spills are 47 and 66 percent, respectively.  The
coefficients of the logs of total mining and manufacturing firms (column A for each chemical
family) are positive but less than one, implying that, ceteris paribus, the number of spills
increases with the number of establishments, but at a decreasing rate.12
Looking at results for the attributes of the state mini-superfund programs (Table 2,
regressions A), we find that the coefficient of strict liability is positive and significant: states
that adopt strict liability continue to have higher rates of toxic spills.  This finding persists
even after we account for the numbers of small production units in a state (regressions B),
allowing small firms to experience spills at a different rate than larger firms.
This finding is robust across different chemical families and specifications: states with
strict liability policies generally have 30 to 70 percent more spills than states maintaining
negligence-based liability standards, above and beyond what is predicted by the level of
economic activity in the state and by the relative numbers of smaller and larger establishments
operating there.13
Excluding the dummy variables that capture other aspects of the state programs
generally does not change the results on strict liability, or their statistical significance.  The
effects of other attributes of the state programs appear to vary with the specification and with
the chemical being analyzed: the presence of punitive damages provisions, for instance, is not
a significant determinant of the number of spills involving acids, but has a strong, negative
effect on the number of spills of TCA, TCE, METH and PERC.
To find whether the number of small and large establishments have different effects on
spills, we performed F tests (for ammonia and acid spills) and likelihood ratio tests (for the
Poisson models) of the null hypothesis that, in each equation B of Table 2, the coefficients of
large firms are equal to their small-firm counterparts.
We obtained mixed results: the null hypothesis of equal small- and large-firm effects
is rejected for spills of acids, chlorine, and the broader halogenated solvent family.  For these
families, the number of small firms is positively and significantly associated with the number
of accidents, but the number of large firms is not.  The contributions of small and large firms
to the frequency of ammonia spills and of the subset of four halogenated solvents is not
statistically different.
The effect of population density is negative for almost all specifications and
chemicals, while the coefficient of membership in leading environmental organizations
                                               
12 For the Poisson regressions, we compute the t statistics based on misspecification-robust standard errors.  The
misspecification robust covariance matrix is (F-1 V F-1), where V is the Fisher information matrix for the Poisson
model, and F is the expected value of the outer product of the score, the score being the vector of first derivatives
of the model (see Fahrmeir and Tutz, 1994).  If the Poisson model is misspecified, V and F can be quite different.
13 The regressions using the broad halogenated solvents data suggest that the number of spills of these chemicals are up to
200 percent greater in strict liability states than what would be predicted by the other independent variables alone.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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frequently switches sign from one regression to the next.  It is certainly possible that plants
located in areas with higher population density feel compelled to exercise care in avoiding
accidents, for fear that accidents will be noticed, reported, and will be expensive to clean up.
However, we worry that the signs of these effects might be the result of the moderate, but
significant, correlation between these variables.
The quantity of hazardous waste generated per resident is also significantly, positively
related to the frequency of spills, in all but the acids regression.  With values ranging from
0.04 to 0.12, however, the effect of HAZWASTE, which serves as a control for the amount of
activity involving substances actually classified as toxic waste, is really not very large.
Interpreting Results
That the presence of strict liability is a positive and significant predictor of spills, even
after controlling for the presence of small production units, is consistent with several possible
explanations.
First, the effect could be real ñ strict liability could give firms fewer incentives to take
care than a negligence standard.  Second, the estimated coefficient of strict liability may
capture the effects of other omitted factors correlated with both the number of spills and the
adoption of strict liability law. We leave this explanation to future research.
Third, the presence of strict liability may have caused the relocation of certain types of
production operations that tend to result in a larger number of spills.  This might be the effect if
adoption of strict liability were to cause larger firms to migrate out of state or to spin off small,
more "judgement-proof" subsidiaries to handle their risky lines of business in-state.  Data
limitations, unfortunately, prevent us from accounting for particular production processes.
Fourth, it is possible that the strict liability dummy captures a heightened reporting
effect on the part of both firms and authorities--that states which have adopted strict liability
are populated by individuals, firms and government officials with a higher propensity to
report spills.  Finally (fifth) the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the strict
liability dummy may be an artifact of the econometric specification.  For instance, if the true
coefficients of the major variables in the model (not only firm and state size variables, but
also the other characteristics of states' cleanup programs ) differ across states that do and do
not have strict liability provisions, imposing that they be equal may result in biased estimates.
To discriminate between the third, fourth, and fifth explanations, we begin by
controlling more carefully for the composition of manufacturing within a state, checking
whether this changes the sign, magnitude, and significance of the strict liability effect.
Formal testing of the fourth and fifth explanations requires that we split the data into
two separate sets, and fit separate regressions for observations from states and years with and
without strict liability hazardous waste laws.  Based on these separate regressions, we perform
two Wald tests.  The first is a test of the "reporting effect", the null hypothesis of which is that
the coefficients of ENVORG and population density are equal across the two regimes.
Rejecting this null hypothesis would imply that at least part of the differences in spills rate
between the two liability regimes are due to reporting effects.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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The second Wald test seeks evidence that under strict liability small plants contribute
disproportionately to the number of spills (as would be the case if, for example, strict liability
resulted in risky operations being shifted to smaller firms).  The null hypothesis of the second
Wald test is, therefore, that the variables measuring small plant effects and those measuring
large plant effects have equal coefficients under the two regimes.
Composition of Manufacturing
Regression results from controlling for the composition of production activities are
reported in Table 3.  We control for the composition of manufacturing in the state by including
as explanatory variables the logs of the numbers of plants in industries that are major users of
the chemicals.  For instance, we predict annual chlorine gas and chlorine dioxide spills using
the numbers of chemical plants (chlorine being a feedstock for other intermediate and finished
chemical products), paper and allied products plants, food processing establishments, and
textiles plants, all of which use these substances for bleaching purposes.14  Similarly,
chlorinated solvents are used as a chemical feedstock, for metal cleaning purposes in
manufacturing, and in the furniture and plastics industries.  Although widely used for dry
cleaning and in the service/repair industry, we do not try to explicitly control for the businesses
in the latter sectors: population density should capture their numbers.
In general, this improves the predictive power of the models, but has a mixed effect on
the strict liability dummy.  For spills involving halogenated solvents, the coefficient of the
strict liability dummy becomes insignificant.  We examined various explanations for this
finding.  One explanation is that the presence of other environmental regulations overwhelms
the incentives posed by liability.  But when we included state regulations and standards for
emissions of halogenated solvents (reported in Sigman, 1996), we found no evidence of a
significant correlation with the number of spills involving these substances.  Other provisions
of the state program (victim compensation and punitive damages) appear still to be associated
with a lower number of spills.15, 16
For ammonia and chlorine spills, strict liability continues to be positively (and
significantly) associated with the number of spills, over and above what is predicted by the
amount of manufacturing in the various industries.  Hence, we focus on these chemicals in our
next analyses.
                                               
14 Table 3 excludes acids.  Because of their widespread use in manufacturing and mining, we do not try to
control for the composition of the industrial sector.
15 Excluding these other attributes makes the strict liability dummy negative, but insignificant.
16 The coefficients of the variables measuring the number of firms in the various manufacturing sectors often
have counterintuitive signs in the halogenated solvents equations of table 3.  We blame this result to the high
degree of collinearity between those regressors: the coefficient of correlation between counts of plants varies
between 0.83 and 0.94.  When we go beyond controlling for manufacturing composition, to also include firm
size, there is little effect on the predictive power of our regression models, and the sign, magnitude and
significance of the coefficient of the strict liability dummy does not change much.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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   Table 3.  Spills in fixed facilities: Composition of manufacturing
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Log Likelihood -3405.85 -2676.01 -344.98
n 373 391 390 390
T statistics in parentheses.  Poisson regressions: misspecification-consistent t statistics.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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Reporting Effect and Structural Change
In Table 4 we report the results of regressions for acids, ammonia and chlorine spills
that isolate the observations from states and years with strict liability from those without it.
The null hypothesis of equal propensities to report spills in states and years with and
without strict liability implies the equality of the coefficients on population density and
environmental awareness.17  The Wald test clearly rejects this null hypothesis, although it is
difficult to identify a pattern for the sign and significance of the two reporting variables across
the chemical families.
The table also displays the results of the Wald test of the hypothesis about firm size.
For each of chemical family, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of
small and of large plants, in logarithm form, are the same across the two liability regimes.
Indeed, the estimation results show clearly that, in strict liability regimes and holding all else
unchanged, variation in the number of spills is explained by variation in the number of
smaller plants (the more small plants, the more spills). The number of larger plants is
typically not significantly associated with the number of spills.  In negligence-based regimes,
this result is reversed in the acids regressions, while in the ammonia and chlorine regressions,
neither firm-size variable is a significant predictor of the number of spills.
These estimated equations predict that the "average" state (i.e., a state with the average
number of small and large manufacturing establishments) should have approximately the
same number of spills under either liability regime.  For instance, in the case of acids the
predicted median number of spills is 9.5 under strict liability and 10.9 with negligence-based
liability; the two figures are not statistically distinguishable.
However, states that have adopted strict liability provisions differ from other states in
one important respect: they typically have more manufacturing establishments.  States with
strict liability boast an average of 5,402 small establishments (against 3,792 for negligence
states), and 2,618 larger plants (against 1,895).  (In both types of state, the proportion of small
to large plants is roughly 2 to 1.)18
Accordingly, taking these differences into account, the two separate regression
equations in Table 4 imply that the predicted number of spills in a year is significantly greater
in states with strict liability.  When differences in the actual numbers of plants are allowed
for, the predicted median number of acid spills in strict liability states becomes 15.6, versus
11.9 in negligence states.  This is consistent with the results of Table 2, where states with
strict liability were seen to experience more spills.  The other chemical families produce
                                               
17 States which adopted strict liability after 1987 have observations in both sets of regressions.  The liability
rules in force at the beginning of each year determine to which regression an observation is assigned.
18 These statistics tend to argue against the notion that larger firms spin off risky activities to smaller firms upon
the adoption of strict liability: there are no differences between "strict liability" states and "negligence" states in
their small-firm fractions.  Over the course of our sampling period, 1987-1995, the fraction of small firms (20 or
fewer employees) changed very little ñ rising from 67 percent to 70 percent even as almost half the states
adopted strict liability.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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Table 4.  Spills in fixed facilities: Separate regressions




















































































Wald test on reporting
variables
25.50 2.32 21.00
Wald test on small and
large plants
40.53 3.43 36.97
T stats in parentheses.  Poisson regressions: misspecification-consistent t statistics.
Wald test on reporting variables tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of LPOPDENS and
ENVORG are equal across the two liability regimes.  The Wald test on small and large plants tests
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of log small and log large plants are equal across the two
liability regimes.  For large samples, both tests are distributed as chi squares with 2 degrees of
freedom under the null hypothesis.  At the 5 percent significance level, the critical value is 5.99.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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similar results.  We conclude that differences in the number of plants and in the higher
propensity of small firms to experience spills is what makes accidents more frequent in states
with strict liability.
When we include other attributes of the mini-superfund programs into the split
regressions, their coefficients generally have the signs we would expect from Shavell's model.
Only when we regress separately on strict-liability states do the coefficients on the punitive
damages and victim compensation dummy variables become uniformly negative across
chemical families.  (In the pooled regressions of Table 2, their effects were uncertain ñ
VICTLAG was usually positive and significant for acids and ammonia spills.)  For instance,
for acid spills in states with strict liability, we get the following estimated equations (t
statistics in parentheses):
ln (acid spills+1) = -3.6070 +0.0993* lpopdens -0.0752*envorg +0.1200*hazwaste
(-6.701) (2.065) (-4.615) (4.582)
(4)
-0.4623*ln(LGMFG) +1.2699*ln(SMLMFG) -0.1955*pundlag +0.0825*citlag -0.2472*victlag
(-2.419) (6.149) (-1.917) (0.835) (-2.098)
In equation (4), the coefficients of PUNDLAG and VICTLAG are negative and significant.
Together, these provisions imply reductions in the number of acids spills of 20 to 26 percent.
CITLAG is positive, which is against expectations, but not statistically significant.
The corresponding regression for states and years without strict liability reveals that
the effects of these variables are positive, but not statistically significant.
7.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the patterns of spills and accidents involving chemicals in an effort
to answer the question: Has strict liability encouraged firms to take care and thus reduced the
number of accidents and spills?  Because the predictions from the theoretical literature are
ambiguous, we have turned to an empirical analysis of this issue.  We have exploited the
variation in the liability provisions of state superfund programs, looking for additional effects
over and above those created by the federal Superfund program.
Our results vary with the chemicals analyzed.  For some of these chemicals
(halogenated solvents), there does not seem to be much difference in spill rates between states
with and without strict liability provisions in their cleanup programs, after we account for the
number of plants and for the composition of manufacturing.
For the other chemicals we have analyzed (acids, chlorine, and ammonia) our
empirical evidence suggests that small and large plants (our proxy for small and large firms)
may contribute differently to spill rates, depending on whether the state's hazardous wastes
policy is based on strict liability or negligence.  Specifically, in states that have adopted strict
liability, small firms appear responsible for a larger share of spills involving these chemicals.
Since states that have adopted strict liability have, on average, more manufacturing firms thanAlberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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states relying on negligence standards, this effect is magnified because there are more small
firms in strict liability states as well.
The small-firm finding is consistent with the predictions of Shavell's theoretical model
of firms' level of care, and could be the result of deliberate firm decisions about their privately
optimal levels of care under different liability regimes.  The result may also be explained by
larger firms subcontracting riskier operations to smaller, more judgement-proof firms.  In
principle, it could also be the result of economies of scale in safety, but if that were the case
there is no reason why states with and without strict liability should differ in the safety of their
small firms.
In the presence of strict liability, other attributes of state cleanup programs that we
believe capture the likelihood of being targeted by the state agency and the potential size of
the damages also appear to affect the number of spills, in a way that is consistent with the
predictions of Shavell's model.  Specifically, in 'strict liability' states, state program attributes
that increase firms' potential liabilities from spills (such as victim compensation provisions) or
the likelihood of being targeted by the agency (such as citizen suit provisions) are associated
with fewer spills and accidents.  By contrast, these attributes do not have a discernible effect
in states that have not adopted strict liability in toxics regulation.
To summarize, we have found evidence that strict liability can increase the frequency
of accidental releases of toxic into the environment.  Further research, hopefully based on
firm-level data, is needed to ascertain the reasons why such effects are seen for some
chemicals but not others, whether production processes are indeed shifted to smaller firms,
and whether a state's adoption of strict liability is potentially endogenous with the incidence
of toxic spills in that state.Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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APPENDIX:  Properties of chemicals
Chlorine is a naturally occurring, greenish yellow gas with an irritating odor, or
present in liquid solutions, and is used in making solvents, many chemicals, synthetic rubber,
plastics, disinfectants, and chlorine bleach cleaners.  Chlorine is acutely toxic to aquatic life.
Chlorine dioxide is a gas with a pungent odor, and is normally diluted to less than 10 percent
in cold solution to reduce its explosive properties. It is sold as a hydrate in frozen form and is
used for bleaching wood pulp, oils, textiles and flour, and in water treatment.  Both of these
gases can both cause irritation (and severe burning) of the eyes, nose, and throat, tearing,
coughing and chest pain.  Higher levels burn the lungs and can cause a buildup of fluid in the
lungs (pulmonary edema) and death. Both gases are highly reactive and explosive in fire.
Ammonia is a highly corrosive and reactive gas that can severely irritate the lungs and
burn the skin and the eyes, leading to permanent damage.  It is found as a colorless gas and in
water solution, and is used in making fertilizers, plastics, dyes, synthetic fibers, glues, animal
foods and explosives.  It is also used in the treatment and refining of metals.
METH is a colorless volatile liquid used in food, furniture and plastics processing, and
in paint removers, and in degreasing and cleaning fluids.  TCE is used as a solvent for
degreasing and dry cleaning, and in printing inks, paints, lacquers, varnishes, and adhesives.
TCA is used in making other chemicals and adhesives, and as a solvent in cleaning metal and
in cleaning plastic molds.  It is also used to make other organic chemicals.  These halogenated
solvents tend to cause unconsciousness, and irregular heart beat, and may result in death at
high exposures.  Long term or extremely high exposures may damage the liver and brain, and
cause skin damage or burns.  They are suspected carcinogens in humans, and
trichloroethylene has been associated with reproductive problems.  These chemicals are
subject to a variety of federal statutes (see Macauley et al., 1992), including the Clean Air
Act, which lists them as hazardous air pollutants.  The National Research Council (1994) lists
TCE, PERC, METH and TCE among the 25 most frequently detected substances at sites with
contaminated ground water, with TCE and PERC being ranked first and third, respectively.
Cleanup of ground water contaminated by halogenated solvents is particularly
difficult.  Traditional pump-and-treat techniques tend to "miss" them due to their high density
and tendency to form "columns" or "fingers" that do not easily mix with the surrounding
groundwater and can re-contaminate the groundwater as pumping and treatment take place
(National Research Council, 1994).  Bioremediation options are also limited for this kind of
solvent (National Research Council, 1993).
The additional chlorinated solvents in the more comprehensive group of halogenated
solvents have similar uses to METH, PERC, TCA and TCE.  The decision of a social planner
on how to allocate the use of methyl ethyl ketone so as to minimize current and future
disposal costs, and the disutility of current and future disposal of this chemical into the
environment, is examined by Eiswerth (1993).Alberini and Austin RFF 98-16
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